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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT OF
PRIOR STATE SUITS ON ACTIONS UNDER SEC RULE 10b-5*
THE Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 a part of a comprehensive national
scheme governing public investment in securities, 2 allows private parties to
maintain actions for damages caused by trading activities which it proscribes
or which are forbidden by Securities and Exchange Commission rules which
implement the act's provisions. 3 Although jurisdiction over such suits is vested
exclusively in the federal courts, 4 conduct giving rise to civil liability under
the federal act is often also actionable under a substantial body of state law
dealing with the sale of securities.5 Rights thereunder were expressly pre-
*Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
1. 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958).
2. The complex of laws of which the Act is a part includes the Securities Act of
1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-mm (1958) ; Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1958) ; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53
Stat. 1149, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-aaaa (1958); Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat.
789, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1958); and Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 847, 15
U.S.C. § 80b (1958). Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 894 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 608 (1958), gives the Securities and Exchange Commission, created by the Securities
Exchange Act § 4, 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 UjS.C. § 78d (1958), advisory functions In
corporate reorganizations.
3. The act contains only four provisions which specifically relate to civil actions:
§ 9(e), 48 Stat. 889, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1958) (market manipulation and stabilization);
§ 16(b), 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958) (insider trading) ; § 18, 48 Stat. 897,
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958) (false registration statements) ; § 29(b), 48 Stat. 903, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78cc(b) (1958) (contracts in violation of the act). Courts, however, have implied civil
liability from the language and purpose of other sections of the act under the doctrine of
tort liability for conduct in contravention of statute. See Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951.); Osborne v, Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947) ; Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), second opinion, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947); Loss, SECURITIES REGUATION .1043-52 (1951); Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 858
(1948) ; Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 537 (1956) ; Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958). The
other acts relating to public investment, see note 2 supra, grant civil jurisdiction concur-
rently to state and federal courts. Securities Act of 1933, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 86, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a) (1958); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 25, 49 Stat. 835, 15
U.S.C. § 79y (1958) ; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1175, 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv(b)
(1.958) ; Investment Company Act of 1940, § 44, 54 Stat. 844, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1958) ;
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 214, 54 Stat. 856, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1958). The
1934 departure from this procedure is not explained in the legislative history. See HI.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; S. Rm. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
5. See Errion v. Connell, 236 F2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Loss, SEcUIrrisS REGULA-
TION 955 (1951). Common-law counts of fraud or deceit will often lie concurrently with
RES JUDICATA-SEC RULE 10b-5
served by Congress. 6 Since state courts -may refuse to adjudicate the federal
claim, 7 and since state adjudications of such claims, when made, probably do
not prevent federal reconsideration," a plaintiff unsuccessful in a state suit may
attempt to maintain a subsequent federal action based on the same facts.
Such an attempt was made in Connelly v. Balk'will.0 Plaintiffs, former
majority stockholders of the Cleveland Frog and Crossing Company, a closely
held Ohio corporation, had previously sued defendant, a director of the com-
pany, in the Ohio state courts, for damages purportedly incurred in the sale
of plaintiffs' stock to a competitor.' 0 As a result of the sale, and prearranged
transactions between defendant and the purchaser, defendant had become the
corporation's sole shareholder and president. The corporation had then sold
or leased all its assets to the competitor. The state-court action was founded
on allegations of common law misrepresentation and breach of a fiduciary
duty; plaintiffs claimed that defendant's concealment of his arrangement with,
and the identity of, the competitor-purchaser resulted in a profit to him con-
siderably in excess of that which they received. The Ohio courts had found,
however, that plaintiffs' own insistence on cash payment at a set price had
rendered defendant's negotiations with the competitor immaterial, and recov-
ery had been denied. Plaintiffs then brought the instant action in federal dis-
trict court." They claimed that defendant's conduct constituted a breach of
an affirmative duty to disclose, and thus fell within the prohibition of fraud
counts under the securities acts. See, e.g., Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa.
1947); cf. Metzger v. Breeze Corps., 37 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1941) (third party com-
plaint not limited to causes of action created by Securities Act of 1933, hence not barred
by act's statute of limitations); M. J. Hall & Co. v. Johnson, 92 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct.
1940) (counts under Securities Act of 1933 dismissed because period of limitations had
run; common-law counts upheld). And forty-eight states currently have statutes regu-
lating securities, commonly called Blue Sky Laws. Delaware's one-paragraph statute was
omitted from the 1953 revision of the state code, while Nevada has never had such an
act. Cowett, Federal-State Relationmrhips in Securities Regulation, 28 Gmo. WVsu. L Rnv.
287, 290 & n.15 (1959).
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28, 48 Stat. 903, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1958);
see text at notes 39-41 infra.
7. Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Associates, Inc., 51 A2d 572 (Del.
1947) (lack of jurisdiction to consider Securities Exchange Act or SEC rules asserted
in proxy fight); American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N.Y. 36, 64 N.E.2d 347 (1945)
(no jurisdiction to hear shareholder's suit under § 16(b) of the act).
8. See notes 23, 24 infra and accompanying text. 0
9. 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
10. Plaintiffs first brought suit in the Court of Common Pleas for Lake County, Con-
nelly v. Balkwill, No. 24234, Ohio C.P., Lake County, June 25, 1952. The Court of
Appeals affirmed on a trial de novo, No. 519, Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., Sept. 15, 1954.
A motion to certify to the Supreme Court of Ohio was overruled, No. 34264, Ohio, Jan.
26, 1955.
11. In this action they joined the competitor and an agent of the competitor in the
sale as additional defendants. A valid claim could be made against these defendants under
the federal act for their part in the alleged fraud. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); note 15 itifra; see note 42 infra.
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in the purchase or sale of securities enunciated by section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act and SEC Tule lOb-5."2
The district court found, on defendant's motion for summary judgment,
that plaintiffs' failure in state court prevented subsequent recovery in a fed-
eral forum under 10b-5. First, the court noted that the facts complained of
in ,both actions were identical. 13 It -then examined Ohio law, and found that
Ohio's common-law requirements of disclosure were as stringent as those of
10b-5.14 T his comparison led the court to hold that the state and federal causes
12. Section 10, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1958), reads
It shall be unlawful for any person,...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
.... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949), supplements this as follows:
Employment of manipidative and deceptive devices by any purchaser of a secur-
ity. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
By basing their claim upon Balkwill's failure to disclose, plaintiffs were attempting
to distinguish this action from the earlier Ohio suit, in which they had alleged conceal-
ment. Plaintiffs' Brief and Affidavit Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, p. 26. They hoped to bring themselves within the purview of Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), which indicates that recovery under lOb-5
does not require proof of the elements of common-law fraud. See Plaintiffs-Appellants
Brief and Appendix Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
pp. 18-20. Whether such reliance was justified is open to question. While commentators,
see, e.g., Note, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1122 (1950), have used this case to support general-
izations about the wide scope of lOb-5, some later holdings have been more restrained,
see Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) ; Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or
Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PaOB. 505, 514, 521 (1953) ; Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 537 (1956).
13. 174 F. Supp. at 51-55.
14. Id. at 56-60.
It is arguable whether Ohio law is in fact as stringent as the law under lOb-5, which
itself is unclear, see note 12 supra. Cases cited by the Balkwill court impose liability for
nondisclosure upon fiduciaries, including directors of corporations dealing with stock-
holders. See, e.g., Beck v. Fishel, 16 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 130 (1909). But whether Ohio
would impose liability on directors dealing with other directors of a close corporation,
as was done under lob-5 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
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of action were the same, and to apply res judicata to bar a second suit. 15 Were
res judicata inapplicable, the court further ruled, collateral estoppel would
defeat plaintiffs' claim."8 The court regarded the state determinations that
defendant's negotiations with the competitor were immaterial and that no fraud
was involved in the transaction 1 7 as facts which could not be relitigated under
that doctrine."'
This application of collateral estoppel seems questionable. Under The Ever-
greens v. Nuian,19 prior findings are given estoppel effect only as to those
points in issue which are "ultimate" rather than "mediate" in the second
actionY° An "ultimate fact" is a point in issue which would constitute a final
1947), is doubtful. As between codirectors, the old Ohio rule of "equal acquaintance" with
the subject might remove the fiduciary obligation to disclose. See Steele v. Worthington,
2 Ohio 182, 195 (1825). Thus, codirectors might have to fall back on the common-law
standards of fraud in the absence of fiduciary duty. To warrant the imposition of liability,
nondisclosure must be of facts which the defendant is under an obligation to disclose.
Conrad v. Sarver, 97 Ohio App. 199 (1954). And while it is clear that nondisclosure of
a breeding cow's barreness is fraud, Hadley v. Clinton County Importing Co., 13 Ohio
St 502 (1862), it is by no means certain that pending sales of assets to competitors xill
be so regarded, see Gray v. Hafer, 2 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 341 (Super. Ct 1904). Moreover,
plaintiffs seeking to recover from defendants not regarded as fiduciaries must prove false
representation or concealment of a material fact, made knowingly and with intent to
deceive the person deceived, on which the victim relies to his detriment. See Lucke v.
Robison & Co., 56 Ohio App. 242, 10 N.E.2d 283 (1937); Davish v. Am, 32 Ohio L
Abs. 646 (Ct App. 1940).
15. 174 F. Supp. at 60.
16. Id. at 63.
17. See id. at 54.
18. Id. at 62. Additionally, the court held the action barred by the statute of limita-
tions. In the absence of an express congressional limitation, the court applied Ohio's four-
year statute for actions based on fraud. Id. at 63-64. This comports with general federal
practice; federal courts have consistently applied to actions under lob-5 the limitations
of the state in which the alleged wrong occurred. See, e.g., Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d
627 (9th Cir. 1953); Fischman v. Raytheon IfMfg. Co., 188 F2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951);
Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. I1. 1952).
One plaintiff in a 10b-5 suit has attempted to bring himself within Holmberg v. Arm-
brecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1945), which held that in the enforcement of federally created
equitable rights, federal courts are to look to the federal doctrine of laches rather than
limitations, by alleging that his suit, for an accounting based on fraud, was wholly equi-
table in nature. This argument was rejected, the court regarding the suit as "mixed,"
within the concurrent jurisdiction of law and equity, and subject to both limitations and
laches. Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323 (D. Del.
1956), aff'd, 244 F2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957), 70 HAav. L REv. 566 (1957). When federally
created rights are not wholly equitable, the state limitation will apply. Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. 461 (1947). See generally Note, Federal Statutes IfWithout Limitations Pro-
visions, 53 CoLuM. L. REv. 68 (1953) ; 2 MooRx, FEDmAL PR.crcE 1 3.07 (2d ed. 1948).
19. 141 F2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944).
20. The Restatement of Judgments was altered in 1948 to conform to Judge Learned
Hand's Evergreens formulation. RESTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment p (Supp.
1948). The rule of Evergreens is regarded as "normal" by the Supreme Court. See Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 338 (1957).
1960]
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adjudication of a legal right; a "mediate fact," on the other hand, is a point
which itself does not raise the right or duty in question, 'but which can only
serve as a basis for the ultimate conclusion. 21 The ultimate fact in the instant
federal action was whether defendant's admitted failure to disclose violated
lOb-5.2 2 Since the state courts deoided at most that under Ohio law he had
no duty to disclose,23 their judgments would not, under Evergreens, collateral-
ly estop subsequent litigation of the lOb-5 claim, which they never reached.
Moreover, had the Ohio courts adjudicated the federal question of plaintiffs'
rights under lOb-5, their decisions would not, under the apparent weight of
authority, .bar subsequent redetermination in a federal suit. While state courts
may decide questions within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction when
they are necessary to the decision of a state action,2 4 federal courts will pre-
vent infringement of their exclusive jurisdiction by refusing to accord to such
state findings the effect of collateral estoppel .2
Furthermore, the court's view of res judicata seems erroneous in theory and
unsusceptible of satisfactory application in other cases. It is, of course, horn-
book law that res judicata will bar a second action only if it is based on the
same "cause of action" as the first.26 But "cause of action," for res judicata,
as for other, purposes, is a phrase which demands specific content. The Balk-
will court assumed that two suits are based on one cause of action only if the
law to be applied in both is the same. In other contexts, however, this narrow
formulation has been rejected, and "cause of action" 'has been defined not 'by
reference to the law applicable in each suit, but to the legal right which fur-
nishes the basis for each claim. For example, an injured seaman, whether
suing under the Jones Act 27 or for unseaworthiness under the general mari-
21. The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 US.
720 (1944) ; Note, 69 YALE L.J. 462, 468 (1960).
22. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457, 458 (D. Del. 1947) (common-
law count dismissed, but lob-5 claim retained since "plaintiffs have alleged the ultimate
fact of violation of the statute").
23. The Ohio Court of Appeals filed as its conclusions of law that Balkwill was not
liable as a director, on the corporate transaction theory, as an agent, or for fraud; and
that no "special circumstances" in the case warranted the imposition of liability. Con-
nelly v. Balkwill, No. 519, Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., Sept. 15, 1954.
24. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947) ; Pratt v. Paris Gas Light
& Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897).
25. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), ceri. denicd, 350 U.S.
825 (1955), 69 HARv. L. REV. 573 (1956); RESxaEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71, comment e
(1942); see Becher v. Contoure Labs., Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929) ("establishing a
fact and giving specific effect to it by judgment are quite distinct"). But see Vanderveer
v. Erie Malleable Iron Co., 238 F.2d 510, 515 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937
(1957) (questioning applicability of § 71 to federal-state relationship) ; Comment, 8 STAN.
L. REv. 439 (1956) (criticizing rationale of exclusive federal jurisdiction).
26. Cromwell v. County of )Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876) ; Miller v. National City Bank,
166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Smith v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S.S. Co., 105 F.2d 604 (5th
Cir. 1939) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 62 (1942).
27. 41 Stat. 1007 (1.920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
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time law, has "a single primary right .... namely, the right of bodily safe-
ty" ;28 and the "single wrongful invasion" of this right by the defendant gives
rise to only one cause of action.29 Similarly, plaintiffs in Balkwill sought in
both actions damages for invasion of a right to be dealt with fairly and with-
out fraud. And the same conduct by defendant-his failure to reveal his
negotiations with the competitor-purchaser-was alleged to have abridged this
right in both suits.3 The "cause of action," therefore, would be the same re-
gardless of any difference in law.3 1 Additionally, under the BalkwilU "corn-
parison" approach, res judicata would not apply in many similar cases, not-
withstanding that only one wrong had invaded one right. The court ruled that
Ohio common law was as stringent in its standards of disclosure as lOb-5,"
but in other states common-law disclosure standards are considerably less
rigorous.3 3 Following Balkwill, a plaintiff who had unsuccessfully sought com-
mon-law recovery in such a state could maintain a later federal action merely
by demonstrating the difference in standards.
28. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927).
29. Ibid.; accord, Troupe v. Chicago D. & G. Bay Transit Co., 234 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.
1956). This rule holds in spite of the fact that recovery for unseaworthiness may be based
only on the vessel's condition, while negligent operation is grounds for relief under the
statute. Ibid.; Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, supra note 28; see Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943) (single injury in course of employment can create only
one cause of action although workmen's compensation act of one state affords greater
recovery than damages awarded in previous action); Villiamson v. Columbia Gas &
Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 470 (3d Cir. 1950) ("the acts complained of and the demand
for recovery are the same. The only thing that is different is the theory of recovery
[violation of Sherman Act §§ 1, 2 in one action; of Clayton Act § 7 in the other].") ;
F. L. Mendez & Co. v. General Motors Corp., 161 F.2d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1947) (primary
right allegedly injured was contract right to automobile franchise, defendant's alleged wrong
was cancellation; therefore only one cause of action, although different theories of re-
covery under Sherman and Clayton Acts put forth in different actions); United States
v. California & Ore. Land Co., 192 U.S. 355, 358 (1904) (United States sought to estab.-
lish its ownership of certain land; first action alleged patents it issued had been forfeited,
second action alleged particular parcel had been excepted from the original grant as an
Indian reservation; "the parties, the subject matter and the relief sought all were the
same. . . . The best that can be said.. . is that now the United States oputs forward a
new ground for its prayer.") ; Schopflocher, What Is a Single Cause of Action for the
Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 21 Or. L Ray. 319, 332 (1942).
30. See 174 F. Supp. at 55, 59. Compare Plaintiffs' Brief, Connelly v. Balkwill, No.
519, Ohio Ct App., 7th Dist., Sept. 15, 1954, with Plaintiffs' Brief, Connelly v. Balkwill,
174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959).
31. See Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954).
32. 174 F. Supp. at 60; see note 14 supra and accompanying text.
33. See Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D.
Ark. 1949) (defendants liable under lOb-S; Arkansas common law would not have al-
lowed recovery). Compare Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625 (D. Del. 1943),
aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945) (recovery denied under Kentucky and
Delaware law), and Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947) (same),
with Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. S08 (D. Del. 1951) (recovery granted
under lOb-5). Professor Loss regards the states which compel disclosure comparably with
lob-5 as a minority. Loss, Sa-cuRaEs REGULATioN 82 (1951).
1960]
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Balkwill's "comparison" theory of res judicata may represent a search for
a formula which would allow plaintiffs to try all possible theories of recovery.
The court may have felt that barring the federal claim when state disclosure
requirements are less stringent than lOb-5 would be unfair to plaintiffs who
can not ordinarily base recovery in the courts of such a state on the more
favorable standard.34 But refurbishing the concept of "cause of action" to ac-
commodate plaintiffs seemingly overlooks the fact that reasonably diligent
plaintiffs can sue in federal court and there employ both state and federal
theories in one action.3 5 Plaintiffs here voluntarily brought their action in a
court which could hear only one theory of recovery. Applying res judicata in
a second suit, irrespective of the limited jurisdiction of the first court,80 will
protect defendants from the expense and uncertainty of relitigation and will
minimize the possibility of nuisance suits, always present in corporate-share-
holder litigation.3 7 Admittedly, the plaintiff who inadvertently pursues his
claims to judgment in state court will be deprived of a federal hearing, but
his plight seems no more deserving of relief through doctrinal alteration of
res judicata than does that of the plaintiff who negligently fails to raise all
theories of recovery open to him in an earlier action.38
Arguably, however, section 28(a) of the act prevents the application of res
judicata. The section provides:
34. See note 7 m.pra.
35. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213
U.S. 175 (1909); UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959); 2
MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 1 2.06[6] (2d ed. 1948).
36. See Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927); RESTATEMENT, JuDG-
mENTS § 62, comment j (1942) ("The plaintiff, having voluntarily brought his action in
a court which can give him only a limited remedy, cannot insist on obtaining a further
remedy in another action."); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. Rv.
1, 22-24 (1.942); Developnnents in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 827
(1952).
37. Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (deriva-
tive action). The number of derivative suits felt to be of this character has resulted in
legislation designed to hamper them. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Corn'. LAW § 61(b); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1959). For criticism of these impediments to shareholder's suits,
see Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLum. L. REV. 1, 3
(1947).
38. See Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1959); Miller v.
National City Bank, 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1.948).
The doctrine of res judicata precludes the parties from showing what is or may
be the truth. Why should not the truth prevail? The answer is based upon public
policy. The interests of the state and of the parties require the putting of an end
to controversies. One way of ending controversies is to precltde the bringing of
an action after a period of time has elapsed, and thus a perfectly valid claim may
be barred by a statute of limitations or by laches. The policy against relitigation
is even stronger.
Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARy. L. REv. 1 (1942). But see Cleary,
Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
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The rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but
no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under... this title
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a
total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act com-
plained of.3
The reference to "one or more actions" can be read as contemplating two
actions arising out of the same prohibited transaction; thus res judicata would
have no place in a Balkwill-type situation. 0 But legislative history indicates
only that this section was intended to prevent federal preemption of the entire
field of securities regulation and not to overrule generally applicable res judi-
cata principles in Securities Exchange Act cases.41 Indeed, since res judicata
applies only when the parties to both actions are identical,42 and since an
aggrieved party may be able to bring different actions based on the same facts
against different parties, for example, one based on a state Blue Sky Law and
another for violation of federal statute,4 3 the multiplicity of actions envisaged
39. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 48 Stat. 903, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1958). Analogous saving clauses appear in the Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 48 Stat. 85,
15 U.S.C. § 77r (1958) ; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 21, 49 Stat. 834,
15 U.S.C. § 79u (1958) ; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1177, 15 U.S.C. § 77zzz
(1958) ; Investment Company Act of 1940, § 50, 54 Stat. 846, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-49 (1958).
40. Res judicata, as judicial policy, will yield to express legislative provisions. See,
e.g., Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 825 (1955); N.Y. MurNc. CT. CoDE § 186, Auster v. Princess Fabrics, 174 Misc.
1096, 22 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (small claims court); N.Y.C. Dom. RE. CT.
Acr § 137.1, Benedict v. Benedict, 203 Misc. 286, 115 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Dom. Re. Ct. 1952).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. RaP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Loss, Smuamrs REmuiXioN 955 (1951); Cowett, Fcdcra-State
Relationships in Securities Regulations, 28 Gmo. WAsH. L. REv. 287, 289 (1959).
42. See, e.g., Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F2d 388 (5th Cir. 1949); REsTATE-
mENT, JuDGmENTs §§ 93, 94 (1942).
The additional defendants joined in the federal Balktil litigation, see note 11 .stpra,
should not have been extended the protection of res judicata. A judgment for or against
one of two joint tortfeasors will not bar a suit against the other where no duty of in-
demnity exists. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1907); Bomar v.
Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947); RESTATEmENT, JuDGmENTrs § 94 (1942). But cf.
Mooney v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 222 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1955). Allowing such suc-
cessive suits against one or another of several joint tortfeasors does not nullify the efficacy
of res judicata. See notes 36-38 mpra and accompanying text. Parties who seem likely
to be sued in a subsequent action can join in the defense of their alleged joint tortfeasor.
The additional defendants in Balkwill could have joined with him in the defense of the
Ohio action. If they did, and gave notice to plaintiffs, they would be entitled, as parties
"in privity" with Balkuill, to the bar of res judicata in a subsequent suit. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Thermoro, Inc., 116 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1941); see Southern
Pac. RR. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897); REsTATEmENT, JUDGMENTs §§ 83,
84 (1.942). The extent of any alleged participation in the prior action thus should have
been considered by the Balkwill court.
43. For example, many of the Blue Sky Laws extend liability to persons not covered
by the Securities Exchange Act or the Securities Act. Illinois holds "the issuer, control-
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by section 28(a) is wholly consistent with res judicata.44 It might still be
argued that employing res judicata to bar a federal suit subsequent to a state
action between the same parties forces an election of remedies and thus negates
that part of this section which preserves "any . . . rights and remedies that
may exist at law or in equity." But requiring plaintiffs to try -al theories of
recovery at once-in a federal suit-would not deprive them of any right,
state or federal, under the common law or under statute.
ling person, underwriter, dealer or other person by or on behalf of whom said sale was
made, and each underwriter, dealer or salesman who shall have participated or aided in
any way in making such sale . . . [and] each of its officers and directors . . . who shall
have participated or aided in making such sale.' ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121%, § 137.13
(1957). Several others extend liability to "every person" participating in or aiding the
sale. See, e.g., Arizona Securities Act, Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1956) ; Oiio
REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Page 1954); Washington Securities Act, WAsH. Rav. Coom
ANN. § 21.04.210 (1957); Wisconsin Securities Law, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 189.18(1)
(1957). Others contain various provisions for liability of particular persons. See, e.g.,
Mica. STAT. ANN. § 19.760 (1959) (salesmen and agents); Florida Uniform Sale of
Securities Law, FIL. STAT. ANN. § 51721(1) (1943) (directors and officers of seller).
Of this group, the statutes of only two states require that the person sought to be held
liable have actual knowledge of the violation-which may have been committed, for ex-
ample, by an issuer, independent of the seller, broker or agent. See Iowa Securities Law,
IowA CoDE ANN. § 502.23 (1949); Oregon Securities Law, OaE. REv. STAT. § 59.250
(1959). In this respect the Blue Sky Laws differ significantly from l0b-5, which refers
only to the person perpetrating the alleged fraud. See Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1.949). Thus a plaintiff who had bought
securities of an insolvent corporation might have a federal claim against the directors
and the corporation for misstatements as to the corporation's financial status, and a second
claim based on state law against a local dealer or agent who actually sold the securities
to plaintiff.
44. See REsTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 84, comment b, 93 (1942).
